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ASTEC is an integral computer code jointly developed by Institut de 
Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN, France) and Gesellschaft für Anlagen- 
und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS, Germany) to assess nuclear power plant behaviour 
during a severe accident (SA). The ASTEC code was used to model and to simulate 
NPP behaviour during a postulated station blackout accident in the NPP Krško. 
The accident analysis was focused on containment behaviour; however the complete 
integral NPP analysis was carried out in order to provide correct boundary 
conditions for the containment calculation. During the accident, the containment 
integrity was challenged by release of reactor system coolant through degraded 
coolant pump seals, molten corium concrete interaction and direct containment 
heating mechanisms. Impact of those processes on relevant containment 
parameters, such as compartments pressures and temperatures, is going to be 
discussed in the paper. 
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Release of radioactive material into the environment is a major concern 
during a hypothetical severe accident. A last barrier for a radioactive release in a 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear power plant (NPP) is the containment, a 
reinforced concrete structure which encloses main components of the primary 
cooling circuit. Since the containment has a large interior volume, it cannot 
withstand a significant pressure difference between the inner and the outer 
surfaces. Failure of a reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and discharge of a core melt 
may challenge the containment integrity. 
A station blackout accident combined with a small LOCA following 
degradation of reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals was chosen as a reference severe 
accident (SA) event. The loss of coolant from the reactor cooling system (RCS) and 
unavailability of safety injection (SI) systems will lead to core uncover, heat-up and, 
finally, degradation and melting. Formation of an in-core molten pool and its 
slumping to the RPV lower head may cause failure of the RPV bottom wall due to 
increased thermal and mechanical stresses. The released corium accumulates at the 
concrete bottom of the reactor cavity. Molten corium concrete interaction (MCCI), 
which begins after the corium hits the cavity bottom, is accompanied with release of 
hydrogen and carbon monoxide which are flammable and explosive gases. Inert gas 
CO2 is also produced and, although it does not represent an explosion hazard, its 
rather high production rate will be the main contribution factor to the containment 
pressure increase. Beside the MCCI, another phenomenon called direct containment 
heating (DCH) will be responsible for the containment pressurization and heat-up. 
In the case of the DCH, molten debris is dispersed in the containment atmosphere 
where the decay heat of the melt is transferred to containment structures and 
walls, and also to air and steam. With increase of the amount of the corium 
discharged during the DCH, the effects of the MCCI will be less severe; however 
accumulation of gases in the containment can lead to substantial pressure increase 
rate. Containment integrity, thus, can be more seriously challenged during the 
DCH than the MCCI. 
The ASTEC code version ASTEC-V2.0-rev3p1 was used in the calculations. 
The ASTEC is a modular computer code consisting of 13 coupled modules that 
model different SA phenomena. For the purpose of presented analyses eight 
modules were used: CESAR, ICARE, CPA, MEDICIS, RUPUICUV, CORIUM, COVI 
and SYSINT. The CESAR module computes two-phase thermal hydraulics (TH) in 
the primary and secondary circuits. Modelling is based on a 1D, two-fluid, five-
equation approach. One incondensable gas (hydrogen) is available. The ICARE 
module models in-vessel core degradation and vessel rupture [1]. The thermal 
hydraulics in the core is based on a 1D swollen water level approach completed by a 
2D gas modelling. The corium behaviour in the lower plenum is based on a 0D 
modelling of corium layers (oxide, metallic and debris layers) with a 2D meshing of 
the RPV lower head. The molten corium concrete interaction is simulated by the 
MEDICIS module [2]. Direct containment heating generated by discharge of corium 
after the vessel rupture is modelled by the RUPUICUV module [3] and the 
behaviour of corium droplets transported by high pressure melt ejection into the 
containment atmosphere and the sump by the CORIUM module [4]. Inside the 




containment the CPA module is responsible for the thermal hydraulic and aerosols 
behaviour calculation and the COVI module for the hydrogen build-up (a simple 
model assuming a virtual combustion, i.e. an adiabatic total combustion without 
any feedback on the CPA thermal hydraulics). For the H2 and CO combustion 
analysis in the containment, a more detailed model (the so-called CPA-FRONT) 
exists in the ASTEC-V2 but it was not used here. The SYSINT module manages all 
engineered safety features such as spray actuation, the safety injection system, 
accumulator injection, pump operation, etc. 
Other five modules are ELSA, SOPHAEROS, ISODOP, IODE and DOSE. 
The ELSA module takes care of fission products and structural material release 
from the core, while their transport in the RCS is modelled by the SOPHAEROS 
module. The ISODOP module calculates the fission products and actinide isotope 
decay, the IODE module the iodine chemistry and the DOSE module, dose rates in 
different containment compartments. 
 
2. MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
 
The NPP Krško mathematical model includes detailed models of primary and 
secondary systems, Figure 1, and the containment, Figure 2. The reactor coolant 
system, steam generators (SG), steam lines, feedwater and auxiliary feedwater 
(AFW) pipes are modelled as a set of thermal hydraulic volumes connected by 
junctions, to which heat structures were attached to simulate heat losses to the 
environment. The ICARE module is used to model the reactor core and the CESAR 
module to model all other plant systems: primary and secondary circuit pipings, the 
pressurizer and the steam generators. Heat losses from the primary system to the 





Figure 1. Primary and secondary systems nodalization for the ASTEC calculation 





Figure 2. Containment 3D nodalization sketch for the ASTEC calculation 
The containment building is represented with 10 control volumes: 
1. DOM (containment dome) – cylindrical/spherical air space above the reactor 
pool, steam generators and pressurizer compartments, 
2. ANL (annulus) – air space between the steel liner and the containment 
building, 
3. SG1 (steam generator 1 compartment) – air space in the SG1 compartment 
that contains components SG1 and RCP1, 
4. SG2 (steam generator 2 compartment) – air space in the SG2 compartment 
that contains components SG2 and RCP2, 
5. PRZ (pressurizer compartment) – air space in the compartment that contains 
pressurizer and primary system safety and relief valves, 
6. BET (between) – lower compartment below the containment dome placed 
between SG1, SG2 and PRZ compartments excluding the reactor pool and the 
reactor pressure vessel area, 
7. RPO (reactor pool) – air space above the reactor vessel filled with water 
during the shutdown, otherwise empty, 
8. ARV (around reactor vessel) – air space between the reactor vessel and the 
primary shield walls, 
9. CAV (reactor cavity) – air space below the reactor vessel including the 
instrumentation tunnel, 
10.SMP (containment sump) – the lowest control volume below the SG1 
compartment that contains the recirculation sump. 




An additional control volume with a large volume and fixed temperature (35 
°C) is used to represent the environment. This volume is necessary for the code to 
calculate heat losses from the containment building. Heat transfer coefficient from 
the outside containment wall to the environment is calculated by the code. 
The control volumes are connected with 23 junctions. That number of 
junctions is larger than required just to connect simply the volumes. More than one 
opening is used between the same volumes if they are located at different elevations 
to promote internal thermal mixing flow, what can be important for long term 
containment transients. For example, there are three connections between the BET 
volume and SG1 and SG2 compartments, respectively, at floor levels. There are also 
more than one connection between the DOM volume and volumes SG1, SG2 and 
PRZ. Pressurizer and steam generator compartments are open and the junction 
areas between those compartments and the dome are large, between 6 m2 and 35 
m2. Other connections, such as between ARV and SG1 and SG2 compartments 
which are through cold and hot leg openings in the primary shield wall are smaller; 
their values were taken to be 1 m2. Connection between the sump and the cavity is 
based on cross section area of 4 inch pipe. The largest connection area is between 
the reactor pool and the dome, 108 m2. The sump and the cavity are connected to 
the SG1 compartment and the BET volume, respectively. The reactor sump is below 
the SG1 compartment with the connection area being 4.5 m2. The cavity is 
indirectly connected to the lower containment compartment (BET) through the 
water tight door. Depending on the state of that door, two cavity types might 
develop, the “wet cavity” and the “dry cavity”, depending on the possibility of water 
flow from the lower compartment to the cavity. Both cases were analyzed and 
discussed in the next section. 
Heat sinks are represented with 79 heat structures. The steel liner, the 
containment building wall, internal concrete and steel walls and floors are explicitly 
modelled. Five heat structures are used to model the steel liner and the 
containment wall. Internal walls and structures, such as the polar crane and fan 
coolers, are represented with 66 heat structures. Floors at three different elevations 
are represented with three heat structures. The last five heat structures represent 
the bottom concrete floor. The heat transfer coefficients for convective heat 
exchange between TH volumes and structures are calculated internally by the code. 
Total convective heat transfer areas are as follows: 
1. Steel liner – 5950 m2 
2. Containment building concrete wall – 6940 m2 
3. Internal walls and structures 
a. Concrete – 2940 m2 
b. Steel (stainless and carbon steel) – 31150 m2 
4. Floors (concrete) – 1560 m2 
5. Bottom concrete floor (foundation) – 510 m2 
 
 




3. RESULTS OF THE CALCULATION 
3.1 Accident Description 
The analyzed transient was a station blackout which included the loss of both 
off-site and on-site AC power. The only systems available were passive safety 
systems: accumulators and the turbine driven AFW system. The high-pressure and 
the low-pressure safety injection pumps were disabled. Containment safety 
systems, fan coolers and sprays, were also inoperable. Following the loss of AC 
power, RCP seals will overheat due to non-existent cooling normally provided by the 
charging pumps, a break will be formed and coolant will be released from the 
reactor cooling system to the containment. 
Reactor coolant pumps and the feedwater pumps were tripped at 0 s. At the 
same time the break at both RCPs was opened. Shortly afterwards, the reactor and 
the turbine were tripped due to the low cold leg coolant flow. Power-operated 
pressurizer and steam generator relief valves were disabled, as well as pressurizer 
heaters. Safety valves were operable, but only SG valves were actuated, since due to 
the LOCA conditions, primary system pressure decreased from the beginning of the 
transient and, thus, no overpressure on the pressurizer safety valves occurred that 
would lead to their opening. 
Five cases were analyzed depending on the fraction of entrained corium 
reaching the containment atmosphere after the breach of the reactor vessel. The 
fraction was varied in the increments of 25%, from 0% to 100%. Dispersed corium 
debris would heat up the air and the structures on which it adheres making it an 
extra heat source in the containment, along with the mass and energy release from 
the primary system. 
Additionally, results of the “wet cavity” and the “dry cavity” calculations were 
compared. The cavity is separated from the containment by the water tight door. 
The door is closed during the normal NPP operation and only after its failure, 
caused by the pressure build-up during the MCCI, water could enter the cavity. The 
“wet cavity” model assumed no door was present from the start of the accident 
maximizing water inflow to the cavity and providing enhanced cooling of the 
corium. In the “dry cavity” model there was no connection between the cavity and 
the annular space surrounding it. However, some water accumulated in the cavity 
because of the condensation of steam released from the primary system, but its 
quantity was negligible. 
3.2 Containment Behaviour 
 
Containment pressures are shown in Figure 3 and containment temperatures 
in Figure 4. After the opening of the breaks and release of the primary coolant, the 
pressure will increase to 120 kPa and remain more or less constant during the next 
three hours. In the meantime, the reactor core will overheat and melt due to the 
absence of the active safety injection systems. Relocation of the molten material to 




the RPV lower head will cause the heat-up and breach of the reactor vessel, and 
release of the corium into the containment cavity. 
 
Figure 3. Containment pressure for different corium entrainment fractions 
 
Figure 4. Containment temperature for different corium entrainment fractions 
Discharge of the molten corium is followed by the blow-down of primary 
circuit gases. If the blow-down is significant enough; the primary pressure at the 
time of the vessel failure is around 5 MPa; it may cause entrainment of the corium 
debris by the hot gases flowing from the cavity to the other compartments of the 
containment. Dispersal of the corium as finely particulate droplets may potentially 
result in a rapid heating and pressurization (direct containment heating). Only a 
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fraction of the corium will reach the containment depending on the user’s input. 
Five cases were analyzed with the fractions being set to 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 
100%. When no DCH was taken into account, a steady pressure increase was 
calculated with the containment temperature being almost constant at 70 °C. The 
pressure rise was attributed to accumulation of incondensable gases released 
during the process of the molten corium concrete interaction. Decay heat of the 
fission products inside the corium was efficiently removed by conduction through 
the containment floor and by convection into the environment. 
Corium entrainment led to fast temperature and pressure increase. In less 
than three hour time, for the case with the minimum fraction of dispersed corium, 
the containment pressure reached 7.5 bar, the value for which the containment 
failure probability is 50% according to the NPP Krško containment fragility curve. 
Heat transfer coefficient from corium droplets to the atmosphere was 500 W/m2K as 
recommended by the ASTEC development team and the heat transfer was 
enhanced by assuming a rapid thermal equilibrium between the droplets in the 
containment atmosphere which is a default option in the code [3]. 
In the case with no corium discharge in the containment, as already 
mentioned, the temperature was constant, but the pressure rose from 1.2 bar to 3.6 
bar. The main reason was production of carbon dioxide during the MCCI process. 
Figure 5 shows partial pressures of gases in the containment. A direct influence of 
the CO2 partial pressure on the total containment pressure can be observed. 
Immediately, after the MCCI started, hydrogen and carbon monoxide were 
produced as a result of oxidation of metals contained in the corium. Their 
accumulation and oxidation heat release were the reasons for the pressure and 
temperature increase in the first 11 hours. After all metals had oxidized, only CO2 
was produced afterwards. There was no abruptly pressure rise because no hydrogen 
or CO ignition was calculated to occur. 
 
Figure 5. Gas partial pressures in the containment 






























Steam                                                                           
N2                                                                              
O2                                                                              
CO                                                                              
CO2                                                                             
H2                                                                              
Total                                                                           




Hydrogen, CO and CO2 are products of the concrete decomposition by the 
molten corium. At temperatures 600–900 °C calcium carbonate is decomposed into 
calcium oxide and carbon dioxide [5]: 
CaCO3 → CaO + CO2 
The reaction is endothermic, thus CaCO3 absorbs energy of the radioactive 
decay of the fission products in the melt. The released CO2 and steam produced by 
evaporation of water from the concrete will be used for the metals oxidation: 
Zr + 2 H2O → ZrO2 + 2 H2 
Zr + 2 CO2 → ZrO2 + 2 CO 
2 Cr + 3 H2O → Cr2O3 + 3 H2 
2 Cr + 3 CO2 → Cr2O3 + 3 CO 
Fe + H2O → FeO + H2 
Fe + CO2 → FeO + CO 
Oxidation of zirconium and chromium are exothermic reactions, while iron 
oxidation is an endothermic reaction [5]. The code assumes that all CO2 is going to 
be spent on metals oxidation, so as long as there are free metal atoms, hydrogen 
and CO are released in the containment, but no CO2. Afterwards, calcium carbonate 
decomposition will be the only reaction associated with release of incondensable 
gases (CO2). This becomes apparent when gas masses are compared (Figure 6). Up 
to 11 hours of the transient, metals oxidation process generated H2 and CO, while 
the mass of CO2 was 0 kg. Metals consumption after 11 hours marked the start of 
CO2 release and termination of H2 and CO generation. 
The final amount of gases produced during the accident is shown in Table I. 
Since CO2 starts to be generated later in the accident, its mass is different than 0 
kg only in the case with no corium entrainment. Hydrogen and CO masses depend 
on the calculation time and mass of reacted corium. The case with 100% corium 
entrainment fraction results with the lowest amount of hydrogen and carbon 
monoxide. The latter is only 0.2 kg because for CO to be produced, there has to be 
CO2 available which is, on the other hand, mainly produced by the concrete 
dissolution. Assuming complete corium dispersal out of the reactor cavity, the 
temperature necessary for CaCO3 decomposition will not be achieved and, thus, no 
CO2 will be released. The amount of hydrogen is 8 kg higher than the mass 
generated during the oxidation of the reactor core in the in-vessel phase of the 
accident (206.6 kg). That additional hydrogen was mainly produced during the 
oxidation reaction of corium debris scattered throughout the containment with the 
steam already present in the containment atmosphere. In short, as the fraction of 
entrained corium increases, the MCCI process becomes less important and CO and 
CO2 production decreases. Positive consequence of that is not only the pressure 
reduction but also the fact that CO is an explosive gas. Hydrogen is still being 
generated, but now, beside the MCCI, also during the oxidation of metals in the 
corium particles. That reaction is less significant than the corium oxidation in the 
reactor cavity due to a smaller amount of accumulated heat. The shortcoming of the 




corium entrainment is the process of direct containment heating which results in a 
much faster containment pressurization. 
 
Figure 6. Mass of incondensable gases in the containment 
 
Table I. Final amount of incondensable gases 
Case Hydrogen [kg] Carbon monoxide [kg] Carbon dioxide [kg] 
0% 555.3 9392 120122 
25% 321.2 1801 0 
50% 272.7 230.1 0 
75% 267.9 72.7 0 
100% 214.7 0.2 0 
 
The molten corium concrete interaction will erode the concrete as shown in a 
sketch on Figure 7. The MCCI is preceded by the processes of corium slumping from 
the vessel into the cavity and the primary circuit gases blow-down which both 
lasted for few seconds after the RPV failure. During the slumping there was no 
corium fragmentation in the water present in the cavity. In the ASTEC ex-vessel 
modules there is no simulation of the fragmentation process. The corium jet 
fragmentation can at present time only be accounted for in the ICARE lower head 
modelling. Therefore, without the DCH that could transport corium fragments 
outside the cavity domain, the MCCI simulation in the ASTEC is in that case 
starting with the corium composition and arrangement strictly as it is when 
entering the cavity from the vessel during the slumping process. At the end of the 
slumping phase, the corium is assumed to be located on the containment bottom, 
completely filling the cavity floor. The spreading area is relatively large (38.2 m2), 
so the initial corium thickness is less than 10 cm. Nevertheless, its potential for 





























CO                                                                              
CO2                                                                             
H2                                                                              




concrete dissolution is large enough to cause severe damage of the containment 
floor. 
 
Figure 7. Cavity erosion during the MCCI 
Figure 8 shows initial and final cavity temperature profiles, indicating 
concrete degradation during the MCCI. Maximum radial and vertical erosion 
depths are shown in Figure 9, while the mass of eroded concrete is shown in Figure 
10. Concrete erosion is a progressive process that could not be mitigated due to 
continuous production of decay heat inside the melt. Hence, the mass of molten 
corium released from the vessel was 23.75 tons and the mass of dissolved concrete 
after seven days of molten corium concrete interaction reached 500 tons with the 
tendency to increase further. The cavity erosion was modelled to be two 
dimensional. The amount of liquefied concrete was calculated based on the data of 
the latent heat of fusion, corium-concrete phase diagrams and the concrete 
composition [2]. The former two data-sets and appropriate correlations are 
incorporated in the code package. The concrete composition was entered in the 
input file. Bali correlation was used to compute the heat transfer coefficient 
between the corium and the concrete [6]. 
    
Figure 8. Initial and final cavity temperature profiles as calculated by ASTEC 





Figure 9. Cavity erosion depths in radial and vertical directions 
 
Figure 10. Mass of eroded concrete 
 
3.3 Influence of Cavity Flooding 
Previous calculations were performed with the water already present in the 
cavity before the melt was released out of the reactor vessel. Water entered the 
cavity compartment through the narrow space between the lower compartment and 
the cavity areas. Normally, that connection does not exist because the space is 
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closed with the water tight door preventing the leakage. The door could only be 
breached by the over-pressurization during, for example, the process of MCCI. A 
calculation with no cavity flooding was performed and its results were compared 
with the “wet cavity” analysis results, Figure 11 and Figure 12. 
 
Figure 11. Containment pressure for the cases with and without the water present 
in the cavity 
 
Figure 12. Mass of eroded concrete for the cases with and without the water present 
in the cavity 
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A dry cavity at the time of corium discharge from the RPV in the containment 
influenced latter containment behaviour. The pressure increased faster than in the 
case with the flooded cavity because more carbon dioxide was released during the 
MCCI. The molten corium concrete interaction was more intensive; more concrete 
was dissolved and larger quantities of H2, CO and CO2 were released. 
The impact of the dry cavity was not as important as the DCH regarding the 
containment integrity. The rate of pressure rise was more than ten times higher for 
the DCH than for the MCCI mechanisms. The DCH was accompanied with a fast 
temperature increase caused by the containment atmosphere heat-up. The heat 
transfer from the dispersed corium to the air and steam forced the pressure to 
increase with the same rate as the temperature. On the other hand, there was no 
significant temperature increase during the MCCI. The process of concrete erosion 
is mainly endothermic [5] except for the initial period of metal oxidation. Decay 
heat inside the corium was removed by conduction through the containment 
foundation, while on the top of the molten material, formation of a crust altered the 




PWR containment behaviour during a hypothetical severe accident was 
analyzed with the ASTEC code. The sequence included release of the coolant from 
the primary system and discharge of corium after the breach of the reactor pressure 
vessel. The containment was modelled with ten control volumes representing real 
compartments such as steam generator, pressurizer, sump and cavity 
compartments. The largest volume was the containment dome above the elevation 
of the uppermost floor slab. 
Containment integrity depends on the inside pressure and temperature. The 
initial release of steam only slightly affected the pressure. Main reasons for the 
containment heat-up and pressurization were the molten corium concrete 
interaction and the direct containment heating. During the MCCI molten corium 
dissolves the concrete and incondensable gases hydrogen, carbon monoxide and 
carbon dioxide are released. Primarily, CO2 is responsible for the pressure rise 
because of its large quantity. Temperature increased by 10 °C shortly after the start 
of the concrete erosion due to oxidation of metals in the corium but afterwards it did 
not change a lot because concrete decomposition is an endothermic process. The 
MCCI is an undesirable severe accident event for the reason of producing 
flammable and explosive gases H2 and CO. No hydrogen or CO deflagration was 
calculated to occur. 
Molten debris dispersion in the containment atmosphere (DCH) led to rapid 
heat-up and pressurization. Decay heat in the melt was transferred to containment 
structures and walls, and also to air and steam which, due to low heat capacity, 
experienced fast temperature rise. The containment pressure reached the threshold 
value for the rupture three hours after the release of the corium in the containment. 




In the case with no DCH, the containment pressure was less than the limiting 
pressure for more than a week, thus, providing important time window to 
undertake mitigating actions. 
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